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ABSTRACT 
 
Impacts of inevitable disasters and climate change have been major concerns for the safety and 
sustainability of communities in the recent past. In an effort to reduce these impacts, 
development of resilience in civil infrastructures is becoming crucial. Conceptually, resilience 
is the ability to absorb, recover from, and adapt to shocks or changing conditions. The current 
practice for infrastructure asset management needs to incorporate this concept of resilience in 
order to reduce or prevent the detrimental consequences not only to the physical infrastructure 
systems, but also to communities and other systems vital for fulfilling human needs. For 
example, consequences can include environmental impacts caused by an incident and 
rehabilitation construction activities, increased costs for the asset management, and 
degradation in the quality of life. Therefore, resilience thinking needs to be practiced for 
designing and managing civil infrastructure systems so that they are resilient to external 
stresses such as climate change and natural disasters. Despite the awareness that resilience can 
be a key to resolve the difficulties with extreme events and climate change and that 
geotechnical assets serve as crucial components in critical infrastructure systems, research in 
the resilience of geotechnical assets is lacking. To put resilience thinking into practical 
applications in geotechnical engineering, a quantitative-based framework suitable and 
applicable for geotechnical assets is necessary.  
      
A quantitative resilience assessment framework applicable for geotechnical assets is proposed 
in this thesis. Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) framework is adopted in 
developing the framework. It quantifies the impacts of damaged geotechnical assets to the 
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relevant civil infrastructure network subjected to hazard scenarios. It also evaluates which 
strategic planning for mitigation and rehabilitation against the hazards is the most effective 
way for improving the resilience of the geotechnical assets. Metrics which reflect robustness, 
rapidity, redundancy, and resourcefulness aspects of resilience are developed for the evaluation. 
Environmental, economic, and social impacts are also concurrently considered to understand 
the trade-offs between the response strategies and their implementation consequences. The 
proposed framework is demonstrated using a case study on road embankments in a 
transportation network connecting London and Toronto in the province of Ontario.  
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CHAPTER 1. INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE - MOTIVATION 
 
The concept of resilience was first introduced in ecology by Holling (1973) in which resilience 
is defined as “the measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change 
and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state 
variables”. In the context of infrastructure, resilience is the ability of a system to withstand 
disruptions and continue to function by rapidly recovering from and adapting to the disruptions 
(National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 2009). The disruptions to physical infrastructure 
systems are typically climate change, and natural and man-made disasters which can cause 
catastrophic damage to the infrastructure systems and have negative impacts on societies if not 
dealt with properly. The necessity of developing resilience in civil infrastructure systems is 
becoming more evident as the effects of climate change become apparent and the frequency of 
natural disasters increases. Climate change gradually alters the load and resistance conditions 
of physical infrastructure systems that can accelerate the deterioration of the physical structures. 
Disasters, either natural or man-made, have the capability to destroy critical infrastructures and 
cause detrimental effects to societies. Therefore, there is a need for efficient maintenance of 
civil infrastructure systems to prepare for and respond to both gradual and instantaneous 
deterioration of the systems. Incorporation of resilience thinking in infrastructure management 
can be the key solution to overcome challenges with unavoidable disruptions. For example, the 
reliability and robustness of infrastructure systems can be enhanced so that the ability to absorb 
external shocks can be increased; systems can be designed to improve redundancy in order to 
maintain their operability and rapidly recover even after disruptions occur; and tactical 
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responses regarding emergency management and resource allocation can be planned in 
advance to better cope with future potential disruptions.  
 
Traditional risk management with fail-safe perspective has dominated the design strategies of 
engineering systems. Reliability of engineering systems on the ability to withstand external 
stresses has been the primary concern in the traditional risk management. However, risk-based 
approaches are only appropriate for events that can be foreseen or forecasted under usual 
scenarios (Korhonen and Seager, 2008). Until now, domination and overconfidence of fail-safe 
perspective led to a lack of safe-fail preparations (Park et al., 2011). For example, the failure of 
Fukushima nuclear reactors in Japan was caused by earthquake and subsequent tsunami, even 
though the plant was designed to resist anticipated natural disasters. The main problem was 
that the nuclear plant was not designed such that it can cope with big surprises (Onishi and 
Glanz, 2011). Fukushima incident, Hurricane Sandy, Hurricane Katrina, and terror attacks in 
urban cities, show that there is a serious limitation in ability to predict unforeseen disasters and 
be able to resist all surprises. It is impossible to design engineering systems that are foolproof 
against all possible threats. Systems should be ensured that it is inherently capable to recover to 
its functionality irrespective of the nature or magnitude of disaster it is subjected to (Basu et al., 
2014). Clearly, practicing only fail-safe approach in designing engineering systems is not 
sufficient, and a different perspective is necessary.  Resilience-based approach contains a safe-
fail perspective which is concerned with minimizing the consequences when unusual, 
unexpected, and unforeseen events are revealed (Korhonen and Seager, 2008; Park et al., 2011). 
It emphasizes the ability to recover from unforeseen disasters rather than resisting all possible 
disasters. 
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It is especially important that the concept of resilience is studied in geotechnical engineering 
because geotechnical assets often play essential roles in civil infrastructure systems but are 
very vulnerable against external shocks. For example, embankments, bridge foundations, and 
tunnels are vital components of transportation infrastructure which provides essential mobility 
service to the public. Soil being the weakest of all the civil engineering materials, vulnerability 
of these geotechnical assets against hazards is among the highest. Moreover, critical 
infrastructures being inoperable because of geotechnical failures can significantly influence the 
functioning of other interdependent critical infrastructures (Rinaldi et al., 2001). For example, 
closure of a transportation network can affect access to medical care, emergency services, and 
food and fuel supply from which their impacts propagate to other critical infrastructures such 
as electric power generation, telecommunications, and water supply facilities (Min et al., 2007). 
Naturally, public safety, economy, and quality of life are connected to the conditions of the 
geotechnical infrastructure to a large extent. Therefore, there is a huge potential for 
geotechnical engineers to improve resilience not only in the physical infrastructure systems but 
also in communities. 
 
In order to practically implement resilience thinking in geotechnical engineering, there is a 
need for a framework that can quantitatively measure the resilience of geotechnical 
infrastructure. Various resilience metrics and sustainability indicators can be incorporated into 
the framework to conduct a comprehensive analysis. The framework can be utilized as a 
decision-making tool for choosing the most resilient geotechnical option among competing 
alternatives and for evaluating the effectiveness of various response tactics to alleviate the 
impacts of disruptive events. The objectives of this study are to propose a framework which 
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quantitatively assesses the resilience of geotechnical infrastructure and to demonstrate the 
framework using a case study. The specific aim of this research study is to demonstrate the 
suitability and adaptability of the proposed framework to measure the resilience of 
geotechnical infrastructure through an example problem. 
 
In this thesis, chapter 2 discusses the concept of resilience in different disciplines like ecology, 
social science, economy, and engineering. A literature review on qualitative and quantitative 
resilience frameworks is also presented. Chapter 3 proposes a new resilience assessment 
framework applicable to geotechnical infrastructures. Chapter 4 demonstrates the proposed 
framework using a case study on a road network in the province of Ontario.  Finally, chapter 5 
presents the concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RESILIENCE CONCEPT AND ASSESSMENT  
 
2.1 Resilience in different disciplines  
Since Holling (1973) first introduced the concept of resilience in ecology, it has been used in 
many other disciplines with modifications to suit the needs of the different disciplines and their 
applications. Therefore, resilience lacks a universal definition which is one of the challenges 
behind putting resilience thinking into real-life practice. In order to evaluate the applicability of 
resilience concept in geotechnical engineering, it is important to study the concept developed 
from various disciplines so that different perspectives on and complex aspects of resilience are 
understood. In this chapter, the concept of resilience, as applied in different disciplines like 
ecology, social science, economy, and engineering, are discussed in brief.  Further, the existing 
resilience assessment frameworks are outlined in brief.  
 
2.1.1 Ecological resilience 
Two different perspectives exist in defining ecological resilience. Biological sciences have 
been contributing in the development of ecological sciences while physical and engineering 
sciences have been involved in shaping environmental sciences (Holling, 1996). Thus, 
ecological resilience has been defined from both biological and engineering perspectives. 
 
Pimm (1984) defined resilience as the speed of a system to return towards its equilibrium 
following a perturbation. This definition focuses on maintaining efficiency of a function, 
constancy of a system, and predictability near a single steady state. It emphasizes resisting 
disturbances and changes in order to conserve or recover what the system originally contained. 
This is an engineering perspective of ecological resilience to achieve fail-safe design. Instead 
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of assuming a single steady state, Holling (1973) introduced the concept of multiple stability 
domains in natural systems, and defined ecological resilience as the ability of a system to 
absorb changes and still persist under threats. This definition focuses on persistence, change, 
and unpredictability. It is perceived that a disturbance to ecological systems can lead to another 
stability domain or regime. Instead of recovering the system after a perturbation, which the 
ecological resilience with engineering perspective focuses on, renewal of system is considered 
here.  This is the biologists’ perspective to achieve safe to fail design (Folke, 2006; Holling, 
1996).  
 
The concept of having multiple equilibriums in ecosystems can be explained using a 
topographic analogy (Figure 1). Three systems with different resistance and resilience are 
shown in Figure 1. The ball represents the system state, and the basins represent the stability 
domains. Equilibrium exists when the ball remains at the bottom of the basin, and disturbances 
to the system cause the ball to move away from its equilibrium and to a transient position 
(Gunderson, 2000). The bottom of the basin is the optimal state of the ecosystem, representing 
the lowest potential energy at which the system maintains order (Mu et al., 2011). Adding 
resistance to a system causes the system to be highly controlled, to operate within a narrow 
band of possible states, and to be designed to resist shocks from its equilibrium (Landscape 1 
in Figure 1). It has the ability to recover from small perturbations; however, it may be 
vulnerable to large perturbations. A resilient system, on the other hand, functions across a 
broad spectrum of possible states, and it is capable of surviving large perturbations (Landscape 
2 in Figure 1). A system with multiple equilibrium points is more resilient than a system with a 
single equilibrium because it can tolerate larger perturbations by shifting into a different 
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equilibrium states but still remain in the same landscape (Landscape 3 in Figure 1) (Fiksel, 
2003). Therefore, ecological resilience with engineering perspective is characterized by the 
slope of the basins. The steeper the basin is, the faster the ball returns to the bottom of the basin 
(i.e., to the stable state). Ecological resilience with biological perspective is characterized by 
the width of the basin and the number of basins (Gunderson, 2000).  
 
Figure 1. Stability landscapes (after Mu et al., 2011) 
 
Recent studies on ecological resilience suggest that human society and natural systems are 
strongly interconnected; therefore, resilience should be considered for combined social-
ecological systems as opposed to only ecological systems. The two ecological resilience 
definitions stated above mostly focus on the persistence and robustness to disturbances. 
However, it is important to realize that disturbance brings opportunities to evolve the systems 
towards a positive direction by renewing the system and following new trajectories. Hence, 
resilience in social-ecological systems focuses on adaptive capacity and transformability. 
Adaptive capacity or adaptability is the capacity of people in social-ecological systems to build 
resilience through collective actions. It relates to learning capabilities and allows continuous 
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development while sustaining with change (Folke, 2006). With reference to the stability 
landscapes (Figure 1), adaptive capacity refers to the ability of the ball to remain in a stability 
domain as the shape of the domain changes (Gunderson, 2000). Transformability is the 
capacity of people to create a fundamentally new social-ecological system when ecological, 
political, social, or economic conditions make the existing system untenable (Folke, 2006; 
Walker et al., 2004).  In terms of stability landscapes, transformability refers to the ability of 
the ball to cross its threshold and shift to a new different desirable landscape.  Carpenter (2001) 
identified three properties of resilience in social-ecological systems: (i) the amount of change 
the system can undergo and still remain within the same domain of attraction, (ii) the degree to 
which the system is capable of self-organization, and (iii) the degree to which the system can 
build the capacity of resilience that reflects the learning aspect of system behaviour in response 
to disturbances. 
 
Dynamic development of complex adaptive systems with interactions across temporal and 
spatial scales is an important aspect of resilience (Folke, 2006). Dynamical systems, such as 
social-ecological systems, pass through four characteristic phases: (i) rapid growth and 
exploitation, (ii) conservation, (iii) collapse or release, and (iv) renewal or reorganization 
(Carpenter, 2001).  Gunderson and Holling (2002) developed the concept of adaptive cycles or 
panarchy in which the processes and patterns in ecosystems transform from one phase to 
another. The rapid growth or exploitative phase is characterized by rapid colonization of 
recently disturbed areas. The system can absorb a wide range of disturbances because of high 
ecological resilience. In the conservation phase, material and energy are accumulated and 
stored. The system's connectedness increases, eventually to become over-connected and 
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increasingly rigid in its control. In the release phase or creative destruction phase, a disturbance 
influences the structure that has accumulated in the previous phases. Disturbances, such as 
forest fires, droughts, insect pests, release the tightly bound accumulation of biomass and 
nutrients that was developed in the conservation phase. Lastly, in the reorganization phase, the 
system becomes most vulnerable to changing stability domains. The system can easily be 
moved from one state to another, and it is disconnected from the processes that facilitate and 
control growth. A new exploitative phase is followed after the reorganization phase, and the 
adaptive cycle continues in a loop. The transformation from one phase to another flows 
unevenly. Biological time from the exploitation phase moves slowly to the conservation phase, 
rapidly to the release phase, rapidly to the reorganization phase, and rapidly back to the 
exploitation phase. Accumulated resources can leak away from the system as the system shifts 
from the reorganization to the exploitation phase because of the collapse of organization 
(Gunderson and Holling, 2002). 
 
2.1.2 Social and economic resilience 
The concept of resilience has been widely used in social sciences and applied to community 
development, disaster management, economy, and psychology. Social resilience is applied to 
social groups or individuals, such as communities, to examine their response to crisis such as 
social, economical, or environmental change. Social stresses can include political violence, 
economical crisis, and change in the physical environment (Adger, 2000; Kimhi and Shamai, 
2004).  The individuals or groups are forced to adapt to changed conditions, and positive 
response to such changes is social resilience or community resilience. Adger (2000) defined 
three properties of social resilience: resistance, recovery, and creativity. Resistance is the 
capacity of a community to withstand a disaster and its consequences.  It can be measured by 
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the degree of disruption that the community can accommodate without undergoing long-term 
changes. Recovery is the ability of a community to rebound from the disaster, and it can be 
measured in terms of the time efficiency for recovery. Creativity relates to the ability of a 
community to learn from the disaster experience and attain a higher level of functioning 
(Adger, 2000; Kimhi and Shamai, 2004; Maguire and Hagan, 2007). Longstaff et al. (2010) 
highlighted the need for developing resource robustness and adaptive capacity for building 
resilient communities. Resource robustness refers to the availability of resources that can 
improve the performance, diversity, and redundancy of communities. For example, resource 
robustness in terms of performance indicates how well the resources accomplish or support an 
essential function of communities. A community with high diversity in resources indicates that 
multiple options for accomplishing the essential functions exist. Redundancy in resources 
means that there are back-up resources available in case failures occur. Adaptive capacity in 
community resilience is understood as the ability of individuals and groups to (i) store and 
remember experiences and local knowledge, (ii) use the experiences and knowledge to learn, 
innovate, and reorganize resources in order to adapt to changing environmental demands, and 
(iii) connect with others inside and outside the community to communicate experiences and 
lessons learned, to self-organize or reorganize in the absence of direction, or to obtain 
resources from outside sources.  
 
The ability to improve community resilience depends on interdependent levels. For example, 
the physical integrity of built environment and critical lifeline infrastructures need to be 
protected by means of building codes and maintenance actions for a community to recover 
from social stresses. The economic, business, and administrative continuity needs to be ensured, 
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and the recovery of emergency management and social institutions are necessary. In addition, 
the community needs to ensure that organizations have the necessary capacities to utilize the 
resources in a way that minimizes disruption and facilitates higher level of functioning (Paton 
and Johnston, 2001).  
 
Social resilience with a geographical perspective (i.e., disaster resilience) is concerned with the 
social and economic impacts of natural disasters to social groups within a community, city, or 
urban environment. Disaster resilience takes into account unique geographical conditions and 
different level of exposure to natural disasters of communities or cities. It is defined as the 
capacity of hazard-affected bodies to resist loss during disaster and to regenerate and 
reorganize after the disaster in a specific area in a given period of time (Zhou et al., 2010). 
 
Economic resilience is defined as "the inherent and adaptive responses to disasters that enable 
individuals and communities to avoid some potential losses" (Rose, 2004). Economic resilience 
focuses on the response behaviour to external shocks rather than mitigation or preparedness. 
Two types of economic resilience are considered  inherent resilience and adaptive resilience. 
Inherent resilience relates to the ability to recover from external shocks under normal 
circumstances (i.e., from shocks that are expected).  For example, inherent resilience is the 
ability of markets to reallocate resources in response to price signals. Adaptive resilience, on 
the other hand, is the ability to apply ingenuity and resourcefulness to recover from crisis 
situations. For instance, the economy of a market can be strengthened by providing information 
to match suppliers and customers (Rose, 2004). 
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Psychological resilience is the capacity of behavioural adaptation of human beings under 
challenging or threatening circumstances. The concept of resilience is widely applied in child 
development, and psychological resilience is described in terms of internal states of well-being. 
Similar to social resilience, psychological resilience is concerned with the ability to resist and 
recover from a trauma. Three properties of psychological resilience are identified by Masten et 
al. (1990)  psychologically resilient children under adverse circumstances display (i) good 
outcomes despite high-risk status, (ii) sustained competence under threat, and (iii) recovery 
from trauma.  
 
2.1.3 Engineering resilience 
The concept of resilience as applied in engineering disciplines mostly follows the definition 
provided by Pimm (1984), which focuses on the robustness against disruption and the speed of 
recovery. As stated by Holling (1996), engineering resilience assumes a single (global) 
equilibrium and focuses on maintaining stability near the equilibrium. Bruneau et al. (2003) 
used the concept of engineering resilience in seismic analysis, and defined community seismic 
resilience as the ability of social groups to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters 
during occurrence, and recover in ways so as to minimize social disruption and mitigate the 
effects of future earthquakes. Seismic resilience of critical lifelines or facilities, such as water 
and power lifelines and hospitals, was examined by Bruneau et al. (2003) because such 
facilities are crucially responsible for community well-being.  
 
In consideration of emergency management for the built environment, infrastructure resilience 
has been drawing attention because functions of infrastructure are vital for communities. The 
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National Infrastructure Advisory Council (2009) defined infrastructure resilience in terms of 
the ability of the infrastructure to reduce the magnitude, impact, or duration of a disruption. 
Infrastructure resilience is defined as the ability to absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover 
from a potentially disruptive event.  According to Bruneau et al. (2003) and Francis and Bekera 
(2014), a resilient system should reflect the following three properties: (i) reduced failure 
probabilities or increased absorptive capacity, (ii) reduced consequences from failures, and (iii) 
reduced time to recovery or increased adaptive capacity. A resilient system should reflect a 
reduced likelihood of being damaged or failure from disruptions. In other words, the ability to 
absorb damage propagation without catastrophic failure should be increased. Furthermore, 
consequences, such as social and economic impacts, should be reduced. Recovery of a resilient 
system from a disrupted state should be attained in a timely manner, which indicates increased 
ability to adapt.  
 
The concept of resilience in infrastructure engineering corresponds to the preparedness and 
response of a system against disruptive events. Preparedness is mostly associated with the 
abilities to proactively mitigate the effects of the disruptive events by arranging adequate 
resources and devising strategies prior to the disruption. Lack of preparedness includes (i) lack 
of understanding and information on the effects of a disruptive event, (ii) failure to appreciate 
the scale of the rescue task, (iii) lack of appreciation of the damage caused to communication 
mechanisms, (iv) lack of situational awareness, and (v) lack of coordination (Perelman, 2007). 
Two types of response  absorption and recovery  can be expected after the event of 
disruption (Francis and Bekera, 2014; Ouyang et al., 2012). Absorption is the immediate 
response of an infrastructure system in which the system withstands the disruption, and 
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recovery is the organizational efforts to rapidly repair the damaged system and the 
consequential effects propagated to other systems (e.g., communities).  Figure 2 shows a 
typical degradation and recovery of system functionality over time. Absorption of shocks is 
reflected by the degradation of the system functionality at the event of disruption (from time td 
to ta in Figure 2). The recovery efforts can be initiated immediately post-disruption; however, 
the system functionality can be unchanged for a certain period of time (from time ta to tr in 
Figure 2) until adequate resources are collected and response strategies are organized (this is 
the assessment stage). Ultimately, it is expected that the system functionality recovers to an 
acceptable level for its normal operation (from time tr to tf in Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Typical loss of resilience over time 
 
Resilience can be further described by four properties: robustness, rapidity, resourcefulness, 
and redundancy (Bruneau et al., 2003). Robustness refers to the strength of systems to 
withstand a given level of stress or demand without suffering a loss of functionality. 
Robustness is reflected in the absorption stage, where absorptive capacity matters. The higher 
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the robustness of the system, the lower the likelihood that the damage propagates and 
consequences occur (Figure 3). Rapidity is the capacity to meet priorities and achieve goals in 
a timely manner in order to contain losses and avoid future disruption. Rapidity can contribute 
in the recovery stage by increasing efficiency in the performance recovery (Figure 4). 
Resourcefulness is the capacity to identify problems, establish priorities, and mobilize 
resources (i.e., monetary, physical, technological, and informational resources). During the 
assessment stage ta to tr, resourcefulness can contribute in lessening the time of assessment. In 
addition, resourcefulness can contribute in developing mitigation measures for disaster 
prevention and contribute in the recovery process (Figure 5). For example, sufficient monetary 
and informational resources reduce the time in identifying damages or vulnerability of the 
system. Redundancy indicates the extent to which existing elements or systems are 
substitutable. Redundancy can reduce the consequences from failures because failure of 
redundant system or units will not significantly affect the overall performance of the system 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. System with high robustness and redundancy 
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Figure 4. System with high rapidity 
 
 
Figure 5. System with high resourcefulness 
 
Bruneau et al. (2003) further categorized resilience within the engineering discipline into 
different dimensions  technical, organizational, social, and economic. Technical dimension 
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refers to the physical response of the infrastructure after disruption; organization dimension 
indicates the capacity of organizations for disaster management and decision-making; social 
dimension considers the impacts of failure of infrastructure system to social groups; and 
economic dimension refers to the economic losses, both direct and indirect, because of the 
occurrence of the disaster. O'Rourke (2007) provided examples of technical, organizational, 
social, and economic activities that support the properties of a resilient community (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Qualities of resilient community 
Property/Dimension Technical Organizational Social Economic 
Robustness 
Building codes and 
construction 
procedures for new 
and retrofitted 
structures 
Emergency 
operations 
planning 
Social 
vulnerability 
and degree of 
community 
preparedness 
Extent of 
regional 
economic 
diversification 
Redundancy 
Capacity for 
technical 
substitutions 
Alternate sites 
for managing 
disaster 
operations 
Availability of 
housing 
options for 
disaster 
victims 
Ability to 
substitute and 
conserve 
needed inputs 
Resourcefulness 
Availability of 
equipment and 
materials for 
restoration and 
repair 
Capacity to 
improvise, 
innovate, and 
expand 
operations 
Capacity to 
address human 
needs 
Business and 
industry 
capacity to 
improvise 
Rapidity 
System downtime, 
restoration time 
Time between 
impact and 
early recovery 
Time to restore 
lifeline 
services 
Time to regain 
capacity and 
lost revenue 
Retrieved from O’Rourke (2007) 
 
Consideration of multiple dimensions of resilience is necessary to enable a holistic 
conceptualization of resilience from an interdisciplinary perspective (Rogers et al., 2012). The 
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Royal Academy of Engineering (2011) outlined the need for conducting a holistic approach: to 
ensure (i) integration and linkages to break down boundaries, (ii) joined up management and 
thus a new form of administration, (iii) a realistic understanding of the costs involved and a 
dialogue between government and the public regarding the extent and level of resilience 
acceptable, (iv) the knowledge of the limitations of what can be achieved in terms of finance, 
engineering, and planning, (v) the removal or change in regulations prohibiting processes and 
systems of management to enable resilience to take place, and (vi) flexible engineering.  
 
2.2 Qualitative frameworks to evaluate resilience 
Qualitative methodologies are useful for screening or preliminary evaluation and comparison 
of complex systems that cannot be represented by a single metric. They are also useful for 
providing an overview of complex systems in a way that is easy to share among professionals, 
stakeholders, and any other decision-makers.  
 
Uda and Kennedy (2015) developed a framework that qualitatively analyzes the resilience of 
communities or cities at a neighbourhood scale. A neighbourhood is defined as a system of 
built form, natural environment, and community. The following steps are carried out to 
conduct resilience assessment of a neighbourhood system using the framework proposed by the 
study: (i) identify the essential needs of a neighbourhood system (i.e., human needs) that are 
required for it to continue function, (ii) identify the future risks (e.g., social, economic, 
technological, political, and environmental risks) to which the neighbourhood may be subject 
to, (iii) determine how the future risks would impact the neighbourhood system and identify 
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actions to prevent or minimize the impacts at the neighbourhood scale, and (iv) determine the 
actions to deal with the impacts if not prevented.  
 
Longstaff et al. (2010) developed a qualitative framework for the assessment of community 
resilience. The framework requires answering questions to evaluate the resource robustness 
and adaptive capacity of communities (see Table 2 for details). 
 
Table 2. Resilience assessment framework by Longstaff et al. (2010) 
Attribute of resilience Question 
General 
Which functions are vital to our community within this 
subsystem? 
Resource robustness 
What resources are available to perform this function? 
How well does this resource perform a particular function? 
How well would it perform in a disruption? 
How much of this resource do we have? 
Are there other resources available that could perform this 
function? 
Adaptive capacity 
To what extent do organizations and informal social 
groups within this subsystem instill and maintain a 
common memory? 
To what extent do organizations and informal social 
groups within this subsystem foster a culture of continuous 
learning and innovation? 
To what extent are organizations and informal social 
groups within this subsystem internally and externally 
connected? Are they loosely connected or tightly 
connected? How will a disturbance that affects one 
organization or social group impact others? 
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Berte and Panagopoulos (2014) utilized a decision support model called SWOT (strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) to generate urban planning strategies and to provide 
evidence for the enhancement of the resilience of cities. SWOT analysis was conducted on a 
city in Portugal to identify which ecosystem services needed to be improved through urban 
green infrastructure. Some examples of SWOT analysis outcomes on the city are provided in 
Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Example of SWOT analysis 
SWOT Description 
Strengths 
Increasing tourism causes less degradation in areas of the city centre 
and more investment in urban green facilities 
 
The presence of wetlands helps regulation of the urban microclimate 
Weaknesses 
The majority of streets, buildings, and open areas do not benefit from 
green facilities 
 
The city suffers low connectivity with the hinterland green areas 
Opportunities 
Urban rehabilitation policy emphasizes the importance of sustainability 
and the use of green walls and green roofs 
 
The regulation services provided by urban green areas can help to 
mitigate flooding and heatwaves and enhance water quality and supply 
 
Urban agriculture improves resilient urban food systems 
Threats 
Flooding in urban areas 
Heatwaves 
Water scarcity and droughts 
Coastal erosion 
Retrieved from Berte and Panagopoulos (2014) 
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Montgomery et al. (2012) utilized causal loop diagrams to comprehensively understand the 
network of interactions within complex adaptive systems. Many engineered systems are 
considered as complex adaptive systems because they include nested and interacting social, 
environmental, and technical components. Causal loop diagrams illustrate the cause and effect 
of hazards, interventions, and regulations; therefore, they are useful for planning, designing, 
and maintaining infrastructure. For example, Montgomery et al. (2012) used causal loop 
diagrams to identify the physical causes of flooding, effects of actions to prevent flooding, and 
effects of introduction of national standards and regulations on road transportation under 
extreme weather events and natural disasters. It is qualitatively evaluated if the effects of 
actions eventually lead to positive or negative adaptive capacity and resilience through 
multiple interactions identified in the causal loop diagrams.   
 
Resilience of a system can also be assessed using the matrix approach which allows inclusion 
of both quantitative and qualitative data in the resilience evaluation process. It simultaneously 
considers multiple properties and dimensions of resilience. Fox-Lent et al. (2015) constructed a 
4 by 4 matrix in which the rows represent general management domains (i.e., physical, 
information, cognitive, and social domain) and the columns represent the stages of disaster 
management (i.e., preparation, absorption, recovery, and adaptation) as shown in Table 4.  
Each cell (box) in Table 4 represents a specific aspect of resilience. For example, the cell for 
information-recovery refers to the ability of a system to collect, monitor, and analyze data that 
is helpful in the recovery stage. The cell for social-adaptation refers to the capacity of users to 
modify behaviour and sustain changes beyond the immediate incident response. The matrix 
was used to quantify the community resilience of a residential area prone to flooding, 
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hurricanes, and coastal storms. Indicators that represent each cell were selected, and scores 
ranging from 0 to 1 were assigned to each indicator by normalizing indicator values with 
respect to the upper bound. If quantification is not possible, expert judgment can be used to 
assign a value ranging from 0 to 1 corresponding to none, low, medium, and high range. The 
matrix can be aggregated by averaging all scores to compare with other communities. 
 
Table 4. Resilience 4 by 4 matrix 
 Preparation Absorption Recovery Adaptation  
Physical 
     
Information 
     
Cognitive 
     
Social 
     
 
 
Shah et al. (2014) developed a decision support framework which examines the resilience of 
geotechnical design solutions to improve socio-economic, technological, environmental, and 
political conditions in the future. The framework is in a multi-criteria matrix form and 
qualitatively analyzes if the effects of geotechnical solutions in terms of their geotechnical 
performance, serviceability, and stability requirements change towards desirable future 
conditions. The scores were qualitatively assigned, ranging from -3 (least resilience potential) 
to 3 (most resilience potential) in regards to the potential of the solutions to improve or degrade 
resilience (Table 5). 
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Table 5. Score assignment for Shah et al. (2014) matrix approach 
Score Description 
+3 Existing solution works with no change in design 
+2 
Existing solution works with minor amendments and 
marginal cost and time implications 
+1 
Existing solution with room for improvement to design with 
reasonable time and cost implications 
0 Neutral or not applicable 
-1 
Existing solution requires design changes with additional 
time and cost implications 
-2 
Existing solution requires substantial design amendments to 
its original form and surrounding area with substantial time 
and cost implications 
-3 
Existing solution does not work and requires replacement 
with re-engineered solution have major time and cost 
implications 
 
 
2.3 Resilience quantification methodologies in engineering 
The concept of resilience embraces several complex aspects, and the most important aspects in 
a study depend on the discipline in question.  In engineering, resilience should be measured in 
terms of both spatial and temporal scales to reflect the system’s progress of degradation and 
development after disruption occurs. Figure 2 is frequently referred to as a guideline to 
understand the typical response of a system to disruptions, and it is related to mathematical 
formulations presented in this section. Resilience of a system can be quantified in terms of the 
change in the system performance over time as expressed in Equation [1] (Bruneau et al., 2003; 
Bocchini and Frangopol, 2011).  
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t t
h t
R Q t t
t

   [1] 
where R  is the resilience, ( )Q t  is the system functionality or performance function, t  is the 
time, dt  is the time when disruption occurs, and ht  is the total inspection time.  Therefore, 
resilience can be simply computed as the integration of a known performance function with 
respect to time.  The boundary conditions are the time at which disruption occurs and a given 
inspection time.  The time, at which full recovery or acceptable recovery of the system is 
achieved, is not used as the upper boundary to ensure that a higher resilience value is assigned 
to the system that recovers at a faster rate and reaches the target recovery over a shorter period 
of time.  
 
The integration of the performance function ( )Q t with respect to time, as described in Equation 
[1], is utilized as the fundamental basis for measuring the engineering resilience of a system, 
and it is widely used in several studies with different definitions of ( )Q t  (Omer, 2013; Comes 
and Van de Walle, 2014; Cimerallo et al., 2010; Tokgoz and Gheorghe, 2013).  For resilience 
quantification, two approaches, deterministic and probabilistic, have been considered in 
engineering as described next.  
 
2.3.1 Deterministic resilience quantification 
Deterministic approaches usually involve assuming the performance function ( )Q t based on a 
known trajectory or as a ratio of performance levels at two different stages of system 
performance.  
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Omer (2013) measured resilience as the integration of performance functions (using Equation 
[1]) with respect to a given time for a transportation network connecting Boston and New York 
City. Three performance functions were defined in terms of travel time, environmental impact, 
and cost. The performance functions were computed as the ratio of the performance level prior 
to the disruption to the performance level after the disruption: 
0( )( )
( )a
Q t
Q t
Q t
   [2] 
where 0( )Q t  is the performance level at 0t  (prior to disruption) and ( )aQ t  is the performance 
level at at  (post-disruption).  For example, the travel time performance function was defined as 
the ratio of travel time from Boston to New York City before the traffic disruption to the 
delayed travel time after the disruption. A similar approach was taken for the other two 
performance functions. The environmental impact was estimated by the increased carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions because of the prolonged time travel after the disruption. The cost was 
estimated by the financial costs caused by users’ extra time, fuel, and mitigation of the 
environmental impacts. The disruption in the road network between Boston and New York 
City was simulated by adjusting the traffic demand and capacity of the roads within the 
network.  
 
Comes and Van de Walle (2014) also measured resilience using Equation [1] and defined the 
performance function for electric power infrastructure as: 
0
*
( ) ( )
( ) 1
( )
f bt
Q t Q t
Q t e
Q t


    [3] 
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where ( )fQ t  is the capacity for a fully functioning physical system, 0( )Q t  is the performance 
level prior to disruption, *( )Q t   is the target performance level after recovery, b  is a fitted 
parameter to model the speed of the recovery processes.  In Equation [3], robustness is 
represented by the ratio   *0( ) ( ) ( )fQ t Q t Q t , and rapidity is represented by the exponential 
term.  Equation [3] assumes that recovery follows an exponential trajectory, and it depends on 
the rapidity parameter b . Comes and Van de Walle (2014) demonstrated the use of Equation [3] 
for the outage of electric power grid affected by Hurricane Sandy and for the outage of power 
delivery system affected by Hurricane Katrina. The robustness and rapidity in Equation [3] 
were empirically estimated using the outage information (i.e., the number of customers 
affected by the power outage).  
 
Several authors defined engineering resilience without using Equation [1].  For example, 
Sandoval-Solis et al. (2011) defined resilience in the context of water management as:  
No. of times D 0 follows 0
No. of times D 0 occured
i i
t t
i i
t
D
R
 


 [4] 
target,t supplied,t target,t supplied,t
target,t supplied,t
 if 
0                           if 
t i i i
i
i it
X X X X
D
X X
   
  
  
  [5] 
where 
i
tD  is the water deficit for time period t  and for i
th
 user, target,t
iX  is the water demand, 
and supplied,t
iX is the supplied water.  They conducted a simulation study for a complex basin 
where both Mexico and United States hold water rights, there exists extended periods of 
droughts, and there is low efficiency in irrigation systems. The effectiveness of various policies 
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on water management for the complex basin was evaluated in terms of resilience. The water 
demand was varied from 20% to 100% to observe the change in resilience.  
 
Henry and Ramirez-Marquez (2011) estimated the resilience of a tram network in a park in 
terms of stage-specific performance levels given by  
0
( *) ( )
( ) ( )
a
a
Q t Q t
R
Q t Q t



  [6] 
where ( *)Q t  is the performance level at the time of interest (i.e., typically after recovery), 
0( )Q t  is the performance level prior to disruption, ( )aQ t  is the performance level after the 
disruption. In simple terms, resilience is measured as the ratio of recovery  ( *) ( )aQ t Q t  to 
the loss of system functionality 0( ) ( )aQ t Q t . If a full recovery is attained from its loss, then 
the resilience is equal to 1 which indicates fully resilient system. If the system reaches a stable 
state at a lower functionality than the original state, then the system is considered less resilient. 
The metric expressed in Equation [6] was demonstrated for a tram network in a park. The tram 
network was expressed as a directed network with nodes indicating the entrance of the park, 
intermediate stops, and final destination. The lengths and capacities (i.e. maximum number of 
trips) were defined for each road. Three different resilience measures were defined in terms of 
(i) the shortest path from the origin to the destination, (ii) number of trips per day to represent 
the flow from the origin to the destination, and (iii) the ratio of length of usable roads to the 
total length of roads to represent the overall health of the network. Two disruption scenarios 
(i.e., rock slide and river floods) were applied to a set of roads, and two restoration strategies 
were examined. The affected roads were restored sequentially one by one at a particular order.  
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Rochas et al. (2015) also utilized Equation [6] to quantify the resilience of a water pipeline 
network used as a heating system for a village. Resilience measures were defined in terms of 
three performance functions: total heated area, number of inhabitants of the heated dwelling, 
and total length of functioning pipelines to represent the overall quality of the network.  
 
Zobel and Khansa (2011) developed a resilience metric assuming that the performance was 
degraded and recovered linearly: 
*
1
2
RXTR
T
   [7] 
where X  is the loss of performance level ranging from 0 to 1, RT  is the time needed for 
recovery to normal operations, and *T is some long time interval. Equation [7] was further 
developed so that it is applicable for multi-events as: 
'
*
( )
1
2
i i R
i
X X T
R
T

    [8] 
where iR  is the partial resilience for event i, iX  is the lost performance level after i
th
 event (i.e., 
first shock at it ), 
'
iX  is the lost performance level before (i+1)
th
 event (i.e., before the second 
shock at 1it  ). Equation [8] computes the area that corresponds to the loss of performance level 
by i
th
 event as shown in Figure 6. For multi-events, the total resilience can be computed as the 
summation of partial resilience iR  as given by 
1 (1 )i
i
R R     [9] 
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Figure 6. System functionality for multi-events 
 
The resilience metrics given in Equations [7]-[9] were used for an earthquake-prone residential 
area. It was assumed that an earthquake will occur followed by a landslide. Five disaster 
scenarios with different impacts of earthquake and landslide were qualitatively described, and 
the expected resilience profiles for the five disaster scenarios were estimated.   
 
2.3.2 Probabilistic resilience quantification 
The probabilistic approaches measure resilience by probabilistically assuming the loss of 
performance levels. For example, fragility functions, which describe the vulnerability of a 
system to a given disaster, are incorporated in defining performance loss functions (Francis and 
Bekera, 2014). The probability of disaster occurrence or probability of being in a specific 
damage state is also incorporated as a weight factor to account for its uncertainty. Recovery 
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functions are defined either probabilistically or deterministically by assuming simple 
mathematical functions.   
 
Bocchini et al. (2014) compared resilience of two types of overpass bridges: girder and frame 
bridges. Seismic fragility of the bridges was analyzed based on the location of the bridges, soil 
conditions, and structural characteristics. For each bridge, the probabilities of no damage, 
slight damage, moderate damage, extensive damage, and total collapse were computed for an 
earthquake with 2,475-year return period. The seismic resilience of the bridges was computed 
in terms of the expected direct and indirect impacts, measured in monetary units, for a given 
seismic event (Equations [10] and [11]). Three functions were used to quantify resilience as 
described in Equations [10]-[12].    
5
1
s s c
dir d d
d
C P C P D

     [10] 
where 
s
dirC  is the expected direct cost associated with the investigated seismic event, 
sP  is the 
probability of occurrence of the investigated seismic event over the life cycle of the bridge, cC  
is the construction cost of the bridge, dP  is the probability of being in damage state, d , as 
computed by the fragility analysis, and dD  is the damage ratio associated with a damage state 
d (d = 1, …, 5 representing the states of no damage, slight damage, moderate damage, 
extensive damage, and total collapse).  
0
[1 ( )]  d
ft
s s
ind rec ind
t
C P f t c t

     [11] 
where 
s
indC  is the total expected indirect costs of the seismic event, ft is the time at which full 
recovery is achieved, ( )recf t  is the expected recovery function, and indc  is the indirect daily 
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cost of structural failure considering costs associated with vehicles on detour. The expected 
recovery path of the bridges affected by the seimic event can be computed as:  
5
1
( ) ( )rec d d
d
f t P Q t

    [12] 
where ( )dQ t  is the traffic flow functionality recovery function obtained from surveys on traffic 
flow capacity.  
 
Francis and Bekera (2014) formulated a resilience metric for infrastructure systems vulnerable 
to natural disasters. The metric is expressed as the ratios of performance levels at different 
stages, and it also includes a parameter that represents the speed of recovery: 
0 0
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in which pS  is the speed recovery, ( )fQ t  is the performance level at full recovery, 0( )Q t  is 
the performance level prior to disruption, ( )aQ t  is the performance level after disruption, RT  is 
the time needed for recovery to normal operations, T is the maximum amount of time at the 
post-disaster stage that is acceptable before recovery ensures, 
*
RT is the time to complete initial 
recovery actions to reach an intermediate state, and a  is the parameter to account for increases 
in the time it takes to reach the final post-disruption state. Francis and Bekera (2014) 
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developed the weighted resilience metric to account for the uncertainty in disaster occurrence 
and vulnerability of infrastructure systems to the disaster, as given below: 
    Pr |w i i
i
R D f Z R     [15] 
where Pr[ ]iD  is the probability occurrence for disaster iD  and ( , )if Z  is the probability 
density function with a system failure mean of   and conditional on event i occurring. The 
resilience metrics shown in Equations [13]-[15] were demonstrated on an electric power 
network exposed to hurricanes. The probability of hurricane occurrence was estimated using a 
Poisson distribution depending on the El-Nino Southern Oscillation, sea level pressure 
anomaly, and temperature. Three strategies were proposed as solutions to avoid the impacts of 
hurricanes for the electric power network: (i) place all overhead structures to underground, (ii) 
place overhead structures in the commercial area only to underground, and (iii) do nothing.  
 
Cimerallo et al. (2010) developed analytical formulations to measure the resilience of physical 
facilities in a community subjected to earthquakes. Equation [1] was used as the resilience 
metric, and the performance function ( )Q t  was formulated as a piecewise continuous function 
in terms of loss and recovery functions as: 
( ) (1 )[ ( ) ( ( ))]d d R recQ t L H t t H t t T f        [16] 
where L  is the loss function, H  is the Heaviside step function, recf  is the expected recovery 
function, t  is the time of interest, RT  is the time needed for recovery to normal operations, and 
dt  is the time at which disruption occurs. Two aspects of resilience, namely robustness and 
rapidity, were quantified as:  
1 ( , )L LRobustness L m     [17] 
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where L  is a loss random variable expressed as a function of the mean Lm and the standard 
deviation L , and   is a multiplier of the standard deviation to decrease uncertainty. The loss 
function was estimated by the expected economic and causality losses. Direct economic losses 
occur instantaneously during the occurrence of disaster, and are given by  
, lim,
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where ( )DEL I  is the direct economic losses for an earthquake with intensity I , ,s jC  is the 
building repair costs associate with a j  damage state, sI  is the replacement building costs, ir  
is the annual discount rate, iT  is the time range in years between the initial investments and the 
occurrence time of the extreme event, i  is the annual depreciation rate, jP  is the probability 
of exceeding a performance limit state j  conditional an extreme event of intensity I  occurs, 
iR  is the response parameter related to a certain measure (e.g., deformation, force, velocity, 
etc.), and lim,ir  is the response threshold parameter correlated with the performance level. 
Indirect economic losses are caused by business interruption which is difficult to quantify.  
Direct causality losses and indirect causalities were quantified as below: 
( ) inDC
tot
N
L I
N
   [20] 
where ( )DCL I  is the direct causality losses for an earthquake with intensity I , inN  is the 
number of injured or dead people caused by the disaster, and totN is the number of occupants in 
the building. 
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   [21] 
where ( )ICL I  is the indirect causality losses for an earthquake with intensity I and 
'
inN  is the 
number of injured persons because of dysfunction. The direct and indirect losses can be 
combined to obtain the total losses as: 
 ( )D I IL L I L    [22] 
  (1 )DED DE DC DCL L L

    [23] 
  (1 )IEI IE IC ICL L L

   [24] 
where DL  is the direct losses, DEL  is the direct economic losses, DCL  is the direct causality 
losses, IL  is the indirect losses, IEL  is the indirect economic losses, ICL  is the indirect 
causality losses, I  is the weighting factor related to indirect losses based on the importance of 
the facilities for the community, DE  is a weighting factor related to construction losses in 
economic terms, IE  is a weighting factor related to business interruption, relocation expenses, 
and rental income losses, DC and IC are the weighting factors related to the nature of 
occupancy (i.e., schools, critical facilities, and density of population). Weighting factors were 
determined based on social-political criteria using cost-benefit analysis, emergency functions, 
and social factors.  
 
The recovery function recf  in Equation [16] was estimated based on simple mathematical 
functions, e.g., linear (Equation [25]), exponential (Equation [26]), and trigonometric 
(Equation [27]) functions:  
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where a  and b  are constant values that are calculated using curve fitting to available data 
sources, RT  is the time needed for recovery to normal operations, dt  is the time at which 
disruption occurs, and t  is the time of interest.  Each function characterizes different 
preparedness and response of communities to disasters.  For example, the linear recovery 
function is assumed when there is no information on the preparedness, resources available, and 
societal response. The exponential recovery function is suitable for communities that have high 
resources and have the capability for rapid recovery in the early stage. The trigonometric 
recovery function is used when there is limited organization and/or resources. The Equations 
[16]-[27] were used to estimate the resilience of a specific hospital building and the resilience 
of a city based on a network of hospital buildings in the city.  
 
Venkittaraman (2013) quantified the seismic resilience of a highway bridge which was 
severely damaged during the Northridge earthquake in 1994.  Equations [1] and [16] were used 
to compute the seismic resilience and performanc function of the highway bridge, respectively. 
In order to model the performance function ( )Q t , defined in Equation [16], the loss and 
recovery functions of the highway bridge also need to be defined. To estimate the loss 
functions, the vulnerability of the bridge against seismic events are determined.  The fragility 
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curves of the bridge describe the probability of bridge failure in a damage state under a certain 
ground motion intensity such as peak ground acceleration (PGA) (Banerjee and Shinozuka, 
2008), and are represented by the following equation: 
ln( / )
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  [28] 
where jPGA  is the peak ground acceleration of a ground motion j, k  is the damage states of 
the bridge (k=1, …, 4 representing the minor, moderate, major damage and collapse states), 
and kc  and k  are fragility parameters for a damage state k which can be estimated by 
maximing the likelihood function L given as: 
1
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where jr = 0 or 1 depending on whether or not the bridge sustains the damage state k against j
th 
ground motion. The loss functions were computed in terms of direct and indirect losses. The 
direct losses are the costs associated with repair and rehabilitation of damaged structural 
components which occur immediately after the seismic event, as given below: 
1
( )
n
D E k
k
L P DS k C r

      [30] 
where C is the replacement cost estimated by multiplying bridge deck area with the unit area 
replacement cost, kr  is the damage ratio corresponding to damage state k as obtained from 
HAZUS, and ( )EP DS k  is the probabillity that the bridge can sustain a damage state k during 
the seismic event E obtained from the bridge fragility curves. The indirect losses include rental, 
income losses, relocation, business interuptions, traffic delay, losses in revenue from traffic to 
businesses. To account for the indirect losses, the  direct losses calculated from Equation [30] 
were multiplied by 13, an average of the range 5-20, as suggested by Dennemann (2009). The 
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recovery functions were modeled using Equations [25]-[27]. Venkittaraman (2013) proposed 
three retrofit strategies to reduce the shear demand from bridge piers: (i) application of steel 
jackets around bridge piers, (ii) assigning seat-type abutment, and (iii) assigning shear keys in 
addition to the seat-type abutment. The seismic resilience of the bridge, after the three retrofit 
strategies were applied, was calculated and compared with the seismic resilience of the bridge 
prior to the seismic event in order to understand the effectiveness of the different retrofit 
strategies. 
 
Tokgoz and Gheorghe (2013) developed a resilience metric for residential buildings subjected 
to hurricane winds by combining Equation [1] and the probability of windspeed as: 
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where w  is the wind speed, 1w  and 2w  are minimum and maximum wind speeds for the 
hurricane category considered according to the Saffir-Simpson hurricane damage potential 
scale, ( )P w  is the distribution for probability of having winds with a speed of w , RT  is the 
time needed for recovery to normal operations, and ( , )Q t w  is the performance function of 
residential buildings. The performance function was expressed in terms of loss and recovery 
functions as:  
1
( , ) 1
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j
j rec
j
Q t w L f

     [32] 
where dsN  is number of damage states, jL  is structural losses for damage state j  , and
j
recf  is 
recovery function for damage state j . The five damage states, j  , for external components of 
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residential buildings were obtained from HAZUS software program. The wind speed 
probability can be estimated using Weibull distribution as: 
1
( ) exp
w
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  [33] 
where   is a Weibull distribution parameter and w  is the wind speed. The structural losses for 
damage state j  can be estimated as:  
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where tI  is total replacement cost for all building types, mN  is number of different building 
types, ,i jI is replacement cost for building type, i ,  in damage state j , ,i jD  is loss ratio 
corresponding to the ratio of building repair costs to building replacement costs for building 
type, i ,  in damage state j , ( | )iP j w  is probability to be in damage state, j , at a given wind 
speed , w, for building type i , and ,i jC is the repair cost for building type i   in damage state j .  
The recovery functions were expressed in simple mathematical functions including linear, 
exponential, normal, and sinusoidal functions to characterize different response scenarios. 
 
Shinozuka et al. (2004) quantified the seismic resilience of communities in Los Angeles 
dependent on electric power supply systems. The seismic resilience was computed in terms of 
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robustness and rapidity (i.e., average recovery rate) of electric power supply systems, as given 
by 
( )aRobustness Q t   [37] 
( ) ( )f a
f a
Q t Q t
Rapidity
t t



  [38] 
where ( )aQ t  is the performance level immediately after disruption, ( )fQ t  is the performance 
level after recovery, ft  is the time at which power supply is restored to 100% performance 
level, and at  is the time at which earthquake occurs. The study considered 47 scenario 
earthquake events and determined fragility curves for electric/mechanical components in 
receiving stations of transmission systems such as transformers, circuit breakers, and 
disconnects switches and buses. The fragility curves describe the probability of failure of the 
components at given PGA and were empirically obtained from damage data of the Northridge 
earthquake. The power output for each service area in Los Angeles was obtained for the 
different earthquake scenarios using the IPFLOW computer code and Monte Carlo simulations. 
The seismic performance of the power supply system was represented by the ratio of the 
average power supply of the damaged network to that associated with the intact network. The 
losses from the earthquakes were quantified in terms of technical (e.g., reduction in power 
supply), societal (e.g., rate of households without power supply), and economic (e.g., regional 
economic loss or employment loss). The reduction in power supply was estimated as: 
100%wo wP P    [39] 
in which 
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where wP  is the percentage of power supply, m is the service area number (1, …, M), n is the 
simulation number (1, …, N), ( , )dP m n  is the power output in service area m under n
th
 
simulation, and ( )P m  is the power output in service area under normal conditions. The 
percentage of households without power (i.e., societal loss) was computed as: 
100%wo wH H    [41] 
in which 
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where wH  is percentage of households with power, ( , )dR m n  is the power output ratio in 
service area m under n
th
 simulation, and ( )Hshld m  is the number of households in service area 
m.  The economic loss can be quantified as: 
,j s s j
s j
L l d e     [43] 
where jl  is a loss factor for industry j that ranges from 0 to 1, sd  is a disruption indicator for 
service area s (d = 1 in case of power outage and d = 0 in case of no outage), and ,s je  is daily 
industry j economic activity in service area s in dollars.  The study expressed the economic loss 
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as the percent of gross regional product (GRP) that would be lost during the power outage 
caused by earthquakes. Using the fragility curves and loss calculations, the expected annual 
probabilities as a function of (i) loss of power supply, (ii) percentage of households without 
power, and (iii) reduction in GRP after an earthquake were computed. The recovery of the 
power supply system was modeled by assuming hypothetical repair and replacement curves for 
the electrical/mechanical components. The seismic resilience of communities was evaluated 
based on system performance criteria defined in terms of robustness, rapidity, and reliability. 
For example, the robustness and reliability of seismic resilience in the technical dimension 
need to have at least 80% of power supply after an earthquake with high level of reliability (i.e., 
99% of annual probability). The rapidity criterion in the technical dimension is to have at least 
95% of power supply as rapidly as possible within 3 days with at least 90% of earthquake 
events. System performance criteria in societal and economic dimension can also be considered.  
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CHAPTER 3. RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Objectives of the proposed framework 
The concept of resilience in different disciplines emphasizes different characteristics or 
properties of resilience, as summarized in Table 6. Different terminologies are used to 
represent similar properties of resilience. For example, persistence, resistance, and robustness 
are similar to each other. Adaptive capacity, creativity, and reorganization signify similar 
properties. Resource robustness and resourcefulness are similar to each other except that 
resource robustness in community resilience also mentions redundancy in resources which is 
similar to the idea of having redundancy in engineered systems. Renewal, transformability, and 
regeneration are also equivalent properties.  
 
It is evident that the recovery aspect of a system is important while defining resilience. 
However, recovery is characterized differently across disciplines. For example, ecological 
resilience (with engineering perspective) and engineering resilience emphasize the speed of 
recovery. Ecological (with biological perspective), social-ecological, and disaster resilience 
describe recovery in terms of transformability. Social-ecological, social, and disaster resilience 
consider adaptability as a mean of recovery.  
 
The key aspects of resilience should include (i) resistance, (ii) recovery in terms of speed, 
adaptability, and transformability, (iii) resourcefulness, and (iv) redundancy. It is important 
that the proposed resilience assessment framework quantifies these key aspects of resilience for 
geotechnical infrastructure and estimates the change in them before and after disruptions.  
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Table 6. Concepts of resilience in different disciplines 
Resilience in different disciplines Properties 
Ecological resilience  
(engineering perspective) 
Speed of recovery 
Efficiency, constancy, and predictability 
Ecological resilience  
(biological perspective) 
Persistence, change, and unpredictability 
Renewal of system (i.e., regime shift) 
Social-ecological resilience 
Adaptive capacity and transformability 
Self-organization 
Learning aspect of system 
Social resilience 
Resistance, recovery, and creativity 
Resource robustness and adaptive capacity 
Disaster resilience Resistance, regeneration, and reorganization 
Engineering resilience 
Robustness, rapidity, resourcefulness, and 
redundancy 
 
The objectives of the proposed resilience assessment framework for geotechnical engineering 
include the followings: (i) to simulate hazard scenarios and quantify the response of 
geotechnical assets in terms of their limit states, (ii) to capture the impacts of damaged 
geotechnical assets to critical infrastructure systems and societies, (iii) to quantitatively assess 
the resilience of geotechnical assets considering the key aspects of resilience (i.e., robustness, 
rapidity, resourcefulness, redundancy, adaptability, and transformability), and (iv) to evaluate 
the effectiveness of response strategies implemented for improving the resilience of 
geotechnical assets. 
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3.2 DPSIR framework 
The structural thinking of the Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) framework, 
developed by the European Environment Agency, is adopted in this study. Although the 
DPSIR framework is widely used as a tool for the reporting and analysis of environmental 
problems, it is reinterpreted so that the proposed resilience assessment framework is applicable 
to geotechnical infrastructures in this study. The DPSIR framework addresses five aspects of a 
given problem: drivers, pressures, states, impacts, and responses (Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7. DPSIR framework 
 
Drivers or driving forces are the fundamental factors that influence the human activities to 
fulfill basic human needs. Pressures are the specific human activities that result from the 
driving forces which impact the system or environment. States refer to the conditions of the 
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natural and built environment, and human systems. Impacts are the ways in which changes in 
the states influence the welfare of humans. Responses refer to institutional efforts to prevent, 
compensate, ameliorate, or adapt to changes in the states (Bradley and Yee, 2015; Carr et al., 
2007; Gabrielsen and Bosch, 2003).  The DPSIR framework is a comprehensive framework 
that fulfills the objectives of the proposed resilience assessment framework outlined in section 
3.1. ‘Drivers’ and ‘pressures’ in the DPSIR framework can describe and simulate the hazard 
scenarios applied to a geotechnical infrastructure; the robustness, rapidity, resourcefulness, and 
redundancy of the geotechnical infrastructure can represent the ‘states’; the technical, 
economic, environmental, and social impacts of the damaged geotechnical infrastructure can be 
described and quantified in the ‘impacts’; strategies in response to the hazard scenarios can be 
planned in the ‘responses’; and effectiveness of the response strategies to improve the 
resilience of geotechnical infrastructure can be evaluated considering the ‘states’ and ‘impacts’ 
in the DPSIR framework. The reinterpretation of the five components of DPSIR framework for 
the proposed resilience assessment framework is discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.2.1 Drivers: identification of driving forces 
The drivers can be understood as the fundamental causes that change the pressures to the 
geotechnical infrastructure. Indicators for drivers should describe the social, demographic, and 
economic developments in societies (Grabrielsen and Bosch, 2003). For example, there are 
economic driving forces which fulfill human needs for food and raw materials, water, shelter, 
health, security, infrastructure, and culture. Social driving forces fulfill human needs for social 
relations, equity, governance, and cultural identity (Bradley and Yee, 2015). Table 7 and Table 
8 provide examples of driving forces which influence different human needs that can be used 
as a guideline to identify the driving forces for a given geotechnical infrastructure.  
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Table 7. Examples of economic driving forces 
Human need Sector 
Food and raw materials 
Agriculture 
Aquaculture 
Oil and gas extraction 
Fishing 
Forestry 
Mining and quarrying 
Water 
Drinking water supply 
Irrigation 
Shelter 
Housing 
Textiles and apparel 
Health 
Medical care 
Pharmaceuticals 
Social assistance (e.g., child care centres) 
Waste management (e.g., sewage treatment 
facilities and landfills) 
 
Culture 
 
Tourism and recreation 
Education 
Information (e.g., telecommunications and 
scientific research) 
Social organizations 
Security 
National defense 
Public administration 
Infrastructure 
Manufacturing and trade 
Transportation 
Construction and civil engineering 
Utilities 
After Bradley and Yee (2015) 
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Table 8. Examples of social driving forces 
Human need Sector 
Social relations 
Family dynamics 
Religious affiliations 
Social groups 
Equity 
Access to education 
Access to healthcare 
Access to jobs 
Governance 
Roles of decision-makers 
Types of government 
Cultural identity Urban, rural, tribal, or coastal communities 
After Bradley and Yee (2015) 
 
The relevant driving forces are identified according to the factors that can affect the primary 
functions of a given geotechnical infrastructure or its associated infrastructure system. For 
example, dams and levees are critical geo-structures for the management of water levels and 
prevention of floods; hence, the drivers are the fundamental causes that affect the water level 
of the regions and the frequency of floods. The local sea level can be affected depending on the 
type of communities; for instance, coastal communities are at higher risk for storm surges and 
floods, and urban communities may affect the water levels because of large areas of 
impervious surfaces. Agriculture, irrigation, drinking water, and fish production (i.e., 
aquaculture) can be factors that influence the amount of water storage that is required (Shultz, 
2002). Oil and gas extraction can cause land subsidence and subsequently change the regional 
water level (Church et al., 2013). Embankments, slopes, tunnels, retaining structures, and 
bridge foundations are important components in transportation networks (Basu et al., 2014). 
These geo-structures provide access and support to road and rail transportation infrastructures 
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for mobility of passengers and goods. Therefore, the drivers can be identified primarily 
focusing on the factors that affect the users’ travel behaviour (e.g., travel distance and 
frequency, and mode of transportation) and business logistics. Oil and gas extraction affect the 
energy or fuel availability for vehicle use. Tourism, recreation, and leisure activities affect 
users’ travel frequency. Manufacturing and trade influence business logistics and the supply of 
goods through freight transportation. Pipeline systems are responsible for the transportation of 
water, energy (i.e., oil and gas), and other fluids through steel or plastic pipes buried 
underground. Considering the fact that transportation and construction sectors are in high 
demand of petroleum products, and residential homes are heated by natural gas, oil and gas 
extraction affect the volume of energy transportation through the pipes. Drinking water and 
irrigation influence the volume of water to be transported. Agriculture affects the need for 
transporting fertilizers and fuels.  Some other examples on the primary functions of 
geotechnical infrastructure to consider are (i) structural support of foundations to 
telecommunication towers, power plants, medical care, and other critical facilities and (ii) 
waste containment in landfill systems using geotechnical clay liners or other geotechnical 
solutions.  
 
3.2.2 Pressures: hazard scenarios 
The driving forces result in pressures which are hazards or threats to the selected geotechnical 
infrastructure over its lifespan. The pressures can be identified according to the eight categories 
of possible threats that physical civil infrastructure may encounter: (i) gradual deterioration 
from ageing, (ii) damage from surface loading or stress relief, (iii) severely increased demand 
and ever-changing demands, (iv) the effects of climate change, (v) the effects of population 
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increase, (vi) funding constraints, (vii) severe natural hazards, and (viii) terrorism (Rogers et al., 
2012). For example, dams and levees can continuously experience gradual deterioration 
because they have relatively low importance than other locations and have minor risks to the 
population, ecosystems, and other critical infrastructures. Increased demands of water storage 
can be caused by drivers related to agriculture, irrigation, and drinking water. Dams and levees 
can be at high risk of floods because of their geographical location (e.g., coastal communities). 
Excessive settlement to road embankments can occur because of loadings from heavy or 
commercial trucks. High traffic demand and congestion can be the effects of population 
increase which is caused by the area being urban and prominent. Embankments in rural areas 
may experience funding constraints in construction and maintenance. Climate change can be 
caused by the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) because of oil and gas extraction 
necessary for pipeline transportation. Pipeline systems that transport flammable fluids and gas 
(e.g., crude oil and natural gas) can be a target of terrorism to cause devastating consequences. 
Different hazard scenarios based on the identified pressures can be generated for a 
comprehensive analysis. 
 
3.2.3 States: geotechnical engineering analysis and characteristics of resilience 
In the proposed framework, the states indicate metrics that represent the resilience of 
geotechnical infrastructure which can be represented by robustness, rapidity, redundancy, and 
resourcefulness aspects of resilience. Robustness of geotechnical infrastructure can be 
represented by the ultimate limit state (ULS) and serviceability limit state (SLS) of the 
geotechnical infrastructure affected by the hazard scenarios. For example, the limit states of a 
foundation are its bearing capacity, which correspond to a ULS, and its allowable settlement, 
50 
 
which represent a SLS.  Geotechnical analyses are performed to calculate the changes in ULS 
and SLS caused by the hazard scenarios generated in section 3.2.2.  Rapidity is characterized 
by the recovery in the limit states of geotechnical infrastructure with respect to time. 
Redundancy can be quantified by the number of substitutable or redundant components within 
the network of geotechnical infrastructure. Resourcefulness can be represented by the costs 
required for construction, maintenance, mitigation, and repair of the geotechnical infrastructure 
compared to an available budget.  
 
3.2.4 Impacts: impacts on the infrastructure systems and societies 
The impacts are interpreted as the effects of damaged geotechnical components to the 
associated infrastructure systems and societies. Many civil infrastructure systems, especially 
transportation networks, are highly dependent on the geotechnical components (e.g., 
embankments, slopes, foundations, and retaining structures). Therefore, the states of the 
geotechnical components, which are disrupted by the hazard scenarios, directly affect the 
functionality of the associated infrastructure system and eventually affect the communities. 
The impacts can be measured from technical, economic, social, and environmental points of 
view. The technical impact refers to the loss of functionality of the infrastructure system 
measured according to their primary functions defined in section 3.2.1.  For example, the loss 
of functionality of dams and levees can be represented by the loss of capacity to retain water. 
The primary function of embankments and other geo-structures in transportation network is the 
mobility of passengers and goods. Therefore, the technical impact can be quantified in terms of 
the increased traffic volumes and travel times. Volume of fuel, water, or other fluids and gas 
can be an indicator to measure the technical impact of pipeline systems. Economic, 
environmental, and social impacts can be measured using relevant sustainability indicators. For 
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example, the economic losses can be measured by the cost of property damage and cost of 
repair. The environmental impacts are the pollution to the air, water, and land. The social 
impacts can be measured by human health impact, life quality index (Pandey and Nathwani, 
2004), public safety (e.g., fatalities, injuries, and evacuations), and equity (Ministry of 
Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2012). 
   
3.2.5 Responses: mitigation and rehabilitation scenarios 
Mitigation and rehabilitation actions are institutional efforts to cope with the hazards and 
disrupted geotechnical infrastructure. Mitigation measures aim for the prevention and reduction 
of the impacts of hazards whereas rehabilitation actions target for recovery of the disrupted 
infrastructure in a timely manner. The rehabilitation actions can be implemented to either 
improve the adaptability or transformability of the disrupted geotechnical infrastructure. If 
complete failure of geotechnical components has not reached, retrofitting or reinforcement of 
geotechnical infrastructure can be undertaken to partially repair the damage and improve their 
adaptability. However, if partial repair is no longer possible because the damage is severe, the 
damaged geotechnical components can be completely rebuilt to transform into a new system. 
Several mitigation and rehabilitation strategies can be planned and combined to generate 
different response scenarios. Improvement of infrastructure functionality, recovery time, 
redundancy, and reduction of impacts can differ depending on which response scenario is 
undertaken. The effectiveness of the response scenarios can be evaluated based on the metrics 
and the impacts determined in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY 
 
4.1 Problem definition 
The proposed resilience assessment framework is demonstrated using an example of a 
transportation network consisting of road embankments in Ontario, Canada. The relationship 
between the road embankment and transportation networks is investigated to systematically 
quantify the resilience of the embankment network. The chosen transportation network 
connects two major cities, London and Toronto, in the province of Ontario. In this study, 
London is considered as the departure location and Toronto as the destination point. The 
transportation network consists of provincial highways (i.e., Highway 401, 403, 427, Queen 
Elizabeth Way), a municipal expressway (i.e., the Gardiner Expressway), a privately owned 
tolled highway (i.e., Highway 407), and arterials (i.e., Highway 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 24, and 59). The 
schematic for the selected transportation network is shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8. London-Toronto transportation network 
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The geometric sections of road embankments considered in this study are simplified as 
trapezoids. Table 9 summarizes the top width, height, and slope of seven different embankment 
sections considered to represent the transportation network for this study. The different 
embankment sections are assigned to different sets of network links as summarized in Table 10. 
The network link No. indicates the numbers shown in Figure 8.  
 
Table 9. Dimensions of embankment sections 
Embankment section No. Top width (m) Height (m) Slope (Vertical:Horizontal) 
1 54 5 1:3 
2 60 7 1:2 
3 40 5 1:4 
4 43 5 1:5 
5 36 5 1:4 
6 50 5 1:3 
7 12 3 1:3 
 
Table 10. Embankment sections for network links 
Embankment section No. Highway/Arterial No. Network link No. 
1 Highway 407 6, 7 
2 
Queen Elizabeth Way and 
Gardiner Expressway 
11, 12 
3 Highway 403 3, 4, 14, 23 
4 Highway 401 1, 2, 21 
5 Highway 401 and 427 5, 8, 13 
6 Highway 403 9, 10 
7 Arterials 4,5,6,7,8,24,59 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 
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4.2 Drivers: importance of the problem  
The primary function of the transportation network and road embankments is to provide 
mobility to the public so that accesses to food and clothing, work, medical care, education, and 
social activities are gained (Wang, 2015). Therefore, the driving forces are the factors that 
motivate human activities to fulfill maximum mobility of passengers and goods to the 
destination point. Transportation mobility can be affected by various drivers including 
demographics, economic and social change, technology, energy, and policy (Akhyani, 2015). 
Demographics such as the population age and gender, household structure, urbanization, and 
immigration affect transportation patterns by causing variation in individual’s travel distance, 
frequency of trips, and car ownership. Human needs for better living and increased personal 
income tend to result in increased possibilities for optimized residential location, purchasing 
transport, and making longer and more frequent trips. Production and trade of goods influence 
the traffic density of freight transportation. Leisure activities and tourism affect travel demand 
as these activities mostly take place outside of private homes (Peterson et al., 2009). 
Development and application of technologies can also influence the transportation patterns. For 
example, satellite tracking of traffic conditions and online ticketing services for public 
transportation can influence the users’ behaviour and the choice of transportation mode. Price 
and availability of energy can influence car ownership, car running costs, passenger costs, and 
trip density and frequency. Policy making, either for short-term or long-term, can potentially 
affect energy prices, passenger traffic, logistics, trade and security policies, migration, tourism, 
and social aspects of living (Akhyani, 2015). 
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In this case study, the identified drivers do not directly affect the calculations for evaluating the 
resilience of the transportation network. However, identification of drivers is necessary and 
useful for comparative assessment of similar infrastructure systems. For example, multiple 
transportation networks at different locations may need to be compared. Since drivers are often 
site-specific, the drivers for the different transportation networks will be different. Depending 
on the importance and value of the identified drivers, the transportation network that is the 
most in need of building resilience can be determined.       
 
4.3 Pressures: flood scenarios 
The traffic demands and patterns caused by the aforementioned driving forces create stresses to 
the road embankments which can affect their stability and serviceability. In addition, the 
atmospheric discharges, like greenhouse gases (GHGs), from the operation of vehicles 
contribute to global warming, climate change, and increased risk of natural hazards. Climate 
change can influence the frequency and intensity of natural hazards. For example, climate 
change can intensify precipitation which causes loss of soil quality, change in water table, 
change in pore water pressure inside the soil, rapid soil wetting, and collapse of fill materials 
(Vardon, 2015). Increased storm water run-off from the impervious surface of pavements can 
also occur. Potential failure modes from increased precipitation include slope failure, erosion 
(either internally or externally), piping, and excessive settlement (Vardon, 2015).  
 
In this study, the generation of hazard scenarios is focused on the natural hazards in Ontario. 
According to the statistics of disaster types in Ontario from 1900 to 2013 provided by 
Nirupama et al. (2014), the most frequently occurred hazards which directly affect the 
performance of road embankments are floods, storms, tornadoes, and winter storms. The case 
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study focuses on floods mainly because it is the most frequent natural hazard in Ontario, and 
hydraulic inputs and outputs to soil and water system are directly significant to geotechnical 
failures (Vardon, 2015). Floods in Canada can be caused by many factors such as excess 
rainfall, storm water run-off over impervious surfaces, drainage problems, snowmelt during 
spring seasons, ice jams, rain on snow, riverine flooding, and failure of natural dams or flood 
management structures (Dotto et al. 2010; Shrubsole et al. 2003).  Four natural hazard 
scenarios on floods are generated with different rainfall intensities – scenarios (1) with 100 
mm/hr, (2) 50 mm/hr, (3) 25 mm/hr, and (4) 10 mm/hr rainfall intensities.  All hazard scenarios 
are assumed to have the same rainfall duration and flood return period which are 6 hours and 
100 years, respectively. For demonstration purpose, only the results obtained from hazard 
scenario 1 are presented in this thesis. It is unlikely that flood occurs simultaneously at all 
locations throughout the entire network; thus, a set of road links in a certain area is selected for 
the investigation. In this case study, five network links are assumed to be affected by the 
hazard scenarios: highway 401 between Woodstuck and Cambridge (link No. 2 in Figure 8), 
highway 403 between the junction and Oakville (link No. 10), highway 401 between 
Cambridge and Morriston (link No. 21), arterial 59 between Woodstuck and Stratford (link No. 
17), and arterial 5 between Cambridge and Hamilton (link No. 20), as indicated in Figure 9. It 
is assumed that only 1/3 of the embankments in the entire link will be affected.  
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Figure 9. Affected road links by the hazard scenarios 
  
4.4 States: characteristics of resilience 
Resilience of the transportation network consisting of road embankments can be calculated 
using Equation [1] with respect to appropriate multiple performance functions like the factor of 
safety (FoS) and settlement.  On the other hand, the characteristics of resilience are represented 
by robustness, rapidity, resourcefulness, and redundancy properties. Robustness of road 
embankments can be quantified in terms of the change in ULS and SLS of embankments, 
which are represented by the slope stability and settlement, respectively, as given below: 
0 (ULS) ( ) ( )aRobustness U t U t     [44] 
0 (SLS) ( ) ( )aRobustness S t S t   [45] 
where 0( )U t  is the initial ULS (factor of safety in this case study) before the occurrence of 
disruption, ( )aU t is the ULS after the occurrence of disruption, 0( )S t  is the initial SLS 
(settlement in this case study) before disruption occurs, and ( )aS t is the SLS after disruption 
occurs.  Thus, U(t) and S(t) are the performance functions, and Equation [1] can be used to 
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calculate the resilience in terms of both ULS and SLS. The lower the value obtained from 
Equations [44] and [45], the more robust the embankments are against the hazards.  
 
The rapidity aspect of resilience for the road embankments can be measured by the recovery of 
FoS and settlement with respect to time as: 
( )
 (ULS)  for a f
dU t
Rapidity t t t
dt
     [46] 
( )
 (SLS)  for a f
dS t
Rapidity t t t
dt
    [47] 
where at  is the time after the disruption (see Figure 2) and ft  is the time at which the system 
reaches full or an acceptable level of recovery. The faster embankments recover, the higher the 
rapidity. 
 
Resourcefulness can be quantified by the ratio of construction costs required for implementing 
a response strategy to the government budget on highway management, as given by 
actual
budget
C
Resourcefulness
C
   [48] 
where actualC  is the costs for carrying out a response strategy and budgetC  is a given budget.  
 
The redundancy aspect of resilience can be represented by how ‘distributed’ the highway 
network is, and can be measured by its entropy, which is an indicator of the heterogeneity of 
link attributes in a transportation network (Xie and Levinson, 2011). The more distributed the 
network, the higher the entropy, and the greater the redundancy. The network entropy is 
calculated using the Shannon entropy as: 
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2log
n
i i
i
H p p   [49] 
where H  is the Shannon entropy or network entropy, n  is the total number of network links, 
and ip  is the proportion of traffic flow at i
th
 link with respect to the total traffic flow over the 
entire network (i.e., traffic demand). 
 
4.5 Impacts: impacts on the transportation network and communities 
The impacts of damaged embankments can be measured with respect to technical, economic, 
environmental, and social impacts. The technical impact of damaged embankments to the 
transportation network is estimated by the change in mobility which is represented by the 
change in traffic volumes over the entire transportation network. It is assumed that the 
capacities of network links to carry a number of vehicles per time are directly affected by the 
slope stability or serviceability of the supporting embankments.  The traffic capacities of the 
network links are assumed to be affected proportionately by the change in FoS and settlement 
of embankments, as summarized in Table 11. The lower of the capacities calculated based on 
FoS and settlement is used in further calculations.  For example, if the FoS of an embankment 
is below 1.0, then it is expected that slip surface failure occurs and the corresponding network 
link becomes inoperable; thus, a capacity of 0% for the affected network link is assumed. If the 
FoS of the embankment is above or equal to 1.5, then it is likely that the road will not be 
severely affected; thus, a capacity of 100% is assumed for such scenarios.  For FoS between 
1.0 and 1.5, the capacity is estimated by linear interpolation. A capacity of 0% is assumed for 
settlement equal to and over 50 mm. A linear interpolation is used for estimating the capacity 
of network links for settlements ranging between the initial settlement and 50 mm settlement. 
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As mentioned earlier, the lowest capacity obtained according to FoS and settlement 
calculations is assigned to the respective network link. 
 
Table 11. Capacity of links based on slope stability and serviceability of embankments 
Slope stability (factor of safety) Serviceability (settlement) 
Capacity = 100% if FoS ≥ 1.5 Capacity = 100 % if settlement = initial settlement 
Capacity = 0% if FoS < 1.0 Capacity = 0% if settlement ≥ 50 mm 
0 < Capacity < 100% if 1.0 ≤ FoS <1.5 0 < Capacity < 100% if 0 < settlement < 50 mm 
 
An optimization study is conducted on the transportation network with the degraded capacities 
(under a hazard scenario) to estimate the change in traffic volumes for all network links. The 
objective of the optimization problem is to minimize the traffic volume over the transportation 
network while meeting the traffic demands from London to Toronto. The transportation 
network is perceived as a directed graph with the cities representing the nodes and the 
highway/arterial links representing the arcs. The optimization is conducted by linear 
programming and solved using the software MATLAB. The algorithm for the optimization 
problem is given below.  
 
Minimize  x           
Subject to the constraints:  
eq eqA x b   [50]  
1 for inflow
1 for outflow
0 otherwise
eqA
 
 
  
 
 
  [51] 
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 for 1
 for 
0 otherwise
eq
D i
b D i m
 
 
   
 
 
  [52] 
Ax b  [53] 
 
1 for 
1 for 
0 otherwise
i e
A i n e
 
 
    
 
 
 [54] 
0b    [55] 
0  for i ix C i n     [56] 
where 
ix  is the traffic volume in annual average daily traffic (AADT) for the i
th
 link,
eqA  is an 
arc-node incidence matrix in size ( , )m n , m  is the number of nodes (cities), n  is the number of 
arcs (network links), D  is the traffic demand in AADT, A  is an arc-node incidence matrix in 
size ( , )e n  , e  is the number of arcs corresponding to toll routes and arterials, and C  is the 
degraded capacity of arcs (network links). 
 
After determining the traffic volume xi, the travel time along any link or route can be 
calculated.  The travel time from one point to another depends on the number of vehicles or 
traffic volumes. It is determined that there are 43 possible routes between London and Toronto 
based on the network considered in this study (Figure 8). Using the degraded traffic capacities 
and the corresponding traffic volumes obtained from the optimization, the travel time in each 
route can be calculated as (Omer, 2013):  
4
1 0.15
88.5
n
i i
k
i i
l x
t
C
  
    
   
  [57] 
where kt is the travel time of route k, n is the total number of arcs in the route k,  and il  is the 
distance of the i
th 
network link.  
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Equations [50]-[52] indicate the equality constraints which describe (i) the outflow from the 
starting point (London) is equal to the traffic demand, (ii) the inflow to the destination point 
(Toronto) is equal to the traffic demand, and (iii) the inflow and outflow at all other cities 
(nodes) are equal. Equations [53]-[55] define the inequality constraints that describe the fact 
that commuters have less preference of taking toll routes (i.e., Highway 407) and arterials. 
Equation [56] defines the lower bound (i.e., non-negativity) and upper bound (i.e., capacity of 
network links) of the traffic volumes. The optimization program was verified by solving two 
similar network flow example problems by Henry and Ramirez-Marquez (2012) on a tram 
network of a park and by Fourer et al. (2003) on a transshipment network. 
 
The economic impacts are quantified by the construction costs for implementing response 
strategies. The environmental impacts of failed road embankments can be estimated by the 
pollution to air caused by construction activities required for implementing response strategies. 
The social impacts are quantified by the damage to human health because of toxic emissions 
generated during any construction activities and by the loss of leisure time during traffic 
congestion.   
  
4.6 Responses: mitigation and rehabilitation scenarios  
In order to prepare for floods and repair geotechnical infrastructure from failures, mitigation 
and rehabilitation strategies have to be made. The mitigation technique for embankments 
considered in this study is construction of toe berms to improve their stability. Three types of 
response actions are considered in this case study: no action, proactive repair to improve 
adaptability, and retroactive repair to improve transformability. The proactive repair refers to 
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retrofitting the embankments before they reach complete failures, and retroactive repair 
indicates reconstruction of the entire embankments because they can no longer be partially 
repaired. Five combinations of the possible mitigation and rehabilitation strategies are selected 
for the response scenarios, as summarized in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Response scenarios 
Response scenario Mitigation Rehabilitation 
1 No action Retrofitting
 
2 No action Reconstruction 
3 Berm construction No action 
4 Berm construction Retrofitting 
5 Berm construction Reconstruction 
 
The retrofitting action in response scenarios 1 and 4 is completed if only it is applicable. If an 
embankment exceeds a certain threshold for slope stability and settlement after the flood 
occurs, it is assumed that retrofitting can no longer be completed; therefore, the failed 
embankment is reconstructed instead. For example, if the FoS of an affected embankment is 
less than 1.0 after the flood, it is assumed that retrofitting is not possible and reconstruction of 
the embankment needs to be completed. If its settlement exceeds 50 mm, the embankment is 
reconstructed instead of retrofitting. For response scenarios 1 and 4, the aim is to retrofit the 
embankments as much as possible. Therefore, depending on the threshold explained above, 
several embankments may be retrofitted while the rest may need to be reconstructed at the 
same time.  
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4.7 Results 
The details of the ULS and SLS calculations for the different embankments of the 
transportation network are demonstrated next. The slope stability of the embankments 
subjected to different rainfall intensities was modeled using RocScience Slide 6.0, and the FoS 
were obtained using the Bishop simplified method. A distributed load of 20 kN/m was axially 
applied at the top horizontal surface of the embankments to represent the traffic loads.  For 
arterials, a distributed load of 15 kN/m was applied to simulate relatively lower traffic loads. 
The initial water table was assumed to be located 1 m below the base of all embankments. The 
boundary conditions on the exposed surfaces of the embankments were set to the respective 
rainfall intensity. The settlement of embankments was estimated from finite element modelling 
using the software RocScience RS2. The same conditions and assumptions defined as used in 
Slide 6.0 were used in the software RS2. The results of slope stability and settlement analyses 
of the embankments subject to hazard scenario 1 (i.e., 100 mm/hr of rainfall intensity) are 
summarized in Table 13.   
 
Table 13. Results of slope stability and settlement analysis for hazard scenario 1 
Embankment 
section No. 
Initial FoS 
FoS after 6 
hours 
Initial settlement 
(mm) 
Settlement  
after 6 hours (mm) 
1 1.902 0.846 33.9 36.6 
2 1.832 0.77 14.1 100.4 
3 1.897 0.946 4.1 4.7 
4 1.894 0.841 28.6 30 
5 1.901 0.928 15.9 22.3 
6 1.885 0.843 10.7 10.8 
7 3.485 2.395 14.9 15.3 
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The geometric sections of toe berms is assumed to be parallelograms, and berms are 
constructed at both sides of toes of the existing embankments. Table 14 provides the top width, 
height, and slope of toe berms for the 7 different existing embankments. Construction of toe 
berms changes the overall geometry of the embankments; therefore, the FoS and settlement 
change accordingly as shown in Table 15. The traffic capacities of affected network links are 
also degraded accordingly; therefore, optimization was conducted using the new traffic 
capacities to examine the effect of implementing the mitigation measure. 
 
Table 14. Dimensions of toe berm sections 
Toe berm for  
embankment section No. 
Top width (m) Height (m) Slope (Vertical:Horizontal) 
1 8 2 1:3 
2 13.5 2.5 1:3.75 
3 15 2 1:3 
4 9 2 1:3 
5 17 2 1:3 
6 20 2 1:3 
7 7 1 1:3 
 
Table 15. FoS and settlement of embankments with toe berms for hazard scenario 1   
Embankment 
section No. 
Initial FoS 
FoS after 6 
hours 
Initial settlement 
(mm) 
Settlement  
after 6 hours (mm) 
1a 1.904 0.929 29.0 31.3 
2a 1.357 0.669 11.5 11.7 
3a 1.897 0.941 3.81 3.88 
4a 1.894 1.30 22.7 22.7 
5a 1.901 0.942 11.7  15.4 
6a 1.885 0.977 4.2 4.2 
7a 2.52 1.50 12.8 13.3 
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In this case study, embankments with three different geometric sections were considered 
affected: section No. 4, 6, and 7 or embankments with toe berms section No. 4a, 6a, and 7a. 
The possibility of retrofitting was determined based on the FoSs because the settlements of the 
affected embankments do not exceed the threshold 50 mm. In response scenario 1, in which toe 
berms were not constructed, embankments in link No. 2, 10, and 21 (see Figure 8) that have 
section No. 4 and 6 cannot be retrofitted because their FoSs are less than 1.0 after the flood 
(see Table 13). Therefore, reconstruction is completed for those embankments instead. In 
response scenario 4, in which toe berms were constructed prior to the flood as a mitigation 
measure, embankments in link No. 10 that have section No. 6 are reconstructed instead of 
being retrofitted because their FoSs are less than 1.0 (see Table 15).  Hypothetical construction 
times were assumed depending on the type of rehabilitation action and the presence of toe 
berms prior to the flood. For example, retrofitting generally takes less time to complete 
compared to reconstruction. Toe berms lessen the damage of flood; therefore, shorter 
construction time for rehabilitation was assumed in response scenarios 1 and 4. The assessment 
period was assumed to be 15 days for all response scenarios.   
 
The effectiveness of different response scenarios (Table 12) was evaluated based on (i) the 
improvement of the highway embankments using the resilience metrics which reflect the four 
aspects of resilience  robustness, rapidity, resourcefulness, and redundancy, and (ii) the 
technical, economic, environmental, and social impacts that have resulted from implementing 
the mitigation and rehabilitation strategies. The robustness aspect of resilience was estimated 
using Equations [34]-[35] for every affected embankment. It was assumed that embankments 
eventually reach at least FoS of 2 and their initial settlement after rehabilitation is completed. 
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Since it was assumed that five different links in the transportation network are affected by the 
hazard scenarios, the average change in FoSs and settlements were computed. Figure 10 and 
Figure 11 show the average change in FoSs and settlements of the affected embankments 
normalized with respect to the initial FoS and settlement, respectively. Table 16 shows the 
average robustness of affected embankments in terms of slope stability (FoS) and settlement 
for all response scenarios.   
 
 
Figure 10. Change in FoS for hazard scenario 1 
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Figure 11. Change in settlement for hazard scenario 1 
 
Table 16. Robustness of road embankments in hazard scenario 1 
Response scenario Robustness (FoS) Robustness (settlement, mm) 
1 1.41  0.74 
2 1.07 0.74 
3 0.83 0.2 
4 0.83 0.2 
5 0.83 0.2 
 
Rapidity corresponds to the speed of recovery to reach the full level recovery as shown in 
Equations [36]-[37]. Table 17 summarizes the average rapidity of recovery in absolute values 
for the five response scenarios based on Figure 10 and Figure 11.  
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Table 17. Rapidity of embankments recovery in hazard scenario 1 
Response scenario FoS/day Settlement/day 
1 0.00368 0.203 
2 0.00697 0.203 
3 0 0 
4 0.00686 0.383 
5 0.00982 0.218 
 
Resilience in terms of FoS and settlement can be computed using Equation [1] by considering 
the change in FoS and settlement, shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, as performance functions, 
( )Q t . Table 18 summarizes the resilience in terms of FoS and settlement for the response 
scenarios  resilience was calculated by integrating the area under the curves in Figure 10 and 
Figure 11 following Equation [1]. In this case study, 100 days of inspection time ht  were 
assumed. 
 
Table 18. Resilience in terms of FoS and settlement 
Response scenario 
Resilience (Equation [1]) 
FoS Settlement 
1 0.690 0.904 
2 0.699 0.908 
3 0.617 0.949 
4 0.814 0.963 
5 0.810 0.978 
 
To calculate the redundancy aspect of resilience, entropy of the transportation network 
considered in this study was computed using Equation [47]. The entropies for the different 
response scenarios were computed based on the change in traffic volumes after rehabilitation 
actions were completed. The traffic volumes used in the computation were obtained from the 
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optimization and are given in Table 19. The change in network entropy over time, shown in 
Figure 12, is expressed in a normalized measurement with respect to the entropy at normal 
condition of the transportation network.  
  
Table 19. Traffic volumes in AADT 
Network link 
No. 
Normal 
condition 
Response scenario 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
1 461858 397239 461858 459603 462667 461858 
2 223651 0 223651 217391 220539 223651 
3 235381 388821 235381 240404 237628 235381 
4 298530 439832 298530 300403 298537 298530 
5 201470 80147 201470 199597 201463 201470 
6 119580 134895 119580 99281 98175 119580 
7 31894 23194 31894 20177 20792 31894 
8 169575 97026 169575 179420 180671 169575 
9 88590 118015 88590 119459 118967 88590 
10 62884 0 62884 0 0 62884 
11 241834 306831 241834 201121 200363 241834 
12 241834 306831 241834 201121 200363 241834 
13 258166 193169 258166 298879 299637 258166 
14 178950 306831 178950 201121 200363 178950 
15 38142 102761 38142 40397 37333 38142 
16 40968 111179 40968 42205 41833 40968 
17 2826 42468 2826 1808 4500 2826 
18 40968 111179 40968 42205 41833 40968 
19 28007 73237 28007 28762 28746 28007 
20 14432 67539 14432 12010 12528 14432 
21 222180 0 222180 218824 221098 222180 
22 20710 0 20710 19227 19636 20710 
23 263388 432461 263388 269166 266374 263388 
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Figure 12. Change in network entropy for hazard scenario 1 
 
Resilience in terms of network entropy was computed by considering the change in network 
entropy, shown in Figure 12, as a performance function in Equation [1]. Table 20 provides 
resilience calculated using Equation [1] in terms of network entropy for the response scenarios. 
 
Table 20. Resilience in terms of network entropy 
Response scenario Resilience (network entropy) 
1 0.904 
2 0.908 
3 0.949 
4 0.963 
5 0.978 
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Because of the delayed traffic and increased travel time, leisure time of individuals is expected 
to decrease throughout the flood event and rehabilitation period. According to Statistics 
Canada (2005) the average leisure time of an individual who resides in Ontario is 324 minutes 
per day. The decrease in leisure time was estimated by the average delay duration of all 43 
possible routes to travel from London to Toronto. The delays in travel time can be calculated 
by comparing the travel times under post-disaster conditions to the travel times under normal-
operation condition. Figure 13 shows the change in leisure time, normalized with respect to the 
standard leisure time (324 minutes), as embankments undergo different response scenarios. 
   
 
Figure 13. Change in leisure time for hazard scenario 1 
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The change in leisure time over time can also represent a performance function; therefore, 
resilience in terms of leisure time was calculated (using Equation [1]) and provided in Table 21. 
 
Table 21. Resilience in terms of leisure time 
Response scenario Resilience (leisure time) 
1 0.436 
2 0.675 
3 0.150 
4 0.999 
5 0.999 
 
The construction cost data by RSMeans (2014) was referred to here for estimating the 
construction costs incurred for the mitigation measure, retrofitting, and complete 
reconstruction of embankments (Figure 14 and Table 22). The types of construction activities 
considered in the cost estimation were installation of barricades, clearing debris, spreading new 
embankment fills, compacting fills, and installation of new sodding.   
 
Figure 14. Construction costs in hazard scenario 1 
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Table 22. Construction costs for mitigation and rehabilitation in hazard scenario 1 
Construction 
activity 
Woodstuck-
Cambridge 
Junction-
Oakville 
Woodstuck-
Stratford 
Cambridge-
Hamilton 
Cambridge-
Morriston 
Complete 
reconstruction 
$ 212 334 748
 
$ 28 592 606 $ 48 363 629 $ 51 090 258 $ 116 875 068  
Berm 
installation 
$ 34 718 182 $ 6 673 118 $ 16 359 318 $ 17 080 236 $ 20 978 798 
Retrofitting 
(no berms) 
$ 96 875 728 $ 11 977 675 $ 34 379 217 $ 36 229 442 $ 54 538 036 
Retrofitting 
(berms) 
$ 90 529 543 $ 7 419 149 $ 21 257 809 $ 22 285 713 $ 51 111 692 
 
Using Equation [38], the resourcefulness aspect of resilience was calculated as the relative cost 
of mitigation and rehabilitation constructions (Table 12) to the operation expense budget of 
Ministry of Transportation Ontario (MTO) on provincial highway management ($ 363 944 485) 
obtained from expense estimates report by Ministry of Finance (2015). The resourcefulness of 
embankments for the five response scenarios are provided in Table 23.  
 
Table 23. Resourcefulness of recovery in hazard scenario 1 
Response scenario Resourcefulness 
1 0.29 
2 0.31 
3 0.07 
4 0.22 
5 0.38 
 
Life cycle assessment (LCA) was conducted to quantify environmental impacts such as global 
warming, terrestrial acidification, freshwater ecotoxicity, terrestrial ecotoxicity, photochemical 
oxidant formation, and human toxicity. Figure 15 shows the normalized environmental impacts 
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with respect to the maximum value obtained in the respective impact category as summarized 
in Table 24. For example, global warming potentials (GWP) for the five response scenarios 
were normalized with respect to their maximum value, 1.70 14×10 kg of CO2. All impact 
categories are greatly influenced by the hauling of embankment fills and have the same 
normalized values as shown in Figure 15. The social impacts were estimated by the damage to 
human health measured in disability-adjusted loss of life years (DALY). Damage to human 
health was also estimated using LCA and is caused by airborne chemicals toxic to human, 
infra-red radiation, and concentrated photochemical ozone (Goedkoop et al., 2013). The human 
health impacts were normalized by the same methodology performed for the environmental 
impact analysis, and the values and trends are the same as shown in Figure 15. The human 
health impacts are also greatly influenced by hauling embankment fills while the impacts from 
operation of machineries and hauling machineries are negligible. Therefore, Table 25 
summarizes the both actual and normalized human health impacts caused by hauling 
embankments only. 
 
Figure 15. Normalized environmental impacts for hazard scenario 1 
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Table 24. Maximum values used for normalizing environmental impacts 
Environmental impact Maximum value Unit 
Global warming 1.70 14×10   Kg of CO2 
Terrestrial acidification 1.05 12×10  Kg of SO2 
Photochemical oxidant 
formation 1.09
12×10  Kg of NMVOC
1
 
Freshwater ecotoxicity 3401647 Kg of 1,4-DB
2
 
Terrestrial ecotoxicity 3373681 Kg of 1,4-DB 
Human toxicity 959526353 Kg of 1,4-DB 
1
NMVOC = Non-methane volatile organic carbon compound 
2
1,4-DB = 1,4 dichlorobenzene 
 
Table 25. Human health impacts in DALY 
Response scenario 
Infra-red 
radiation 
Photochemical 
ozone  
Human toxic 
emission  
Normalized 
Human health impact 
1 105503533 18886  298 0.44 
2 83526238 14952 236 0.35 
3 2827564 506 8 0.01 
4 102185699 18292 289 0.43 
5 237644768 42540 672 1 
 
 
Considering all aspects of sustainability and resilience, it is apparent that response scenarios 4 
and 5 are the most resilient options.  However, considering the sustainability aspects, i.e., 
environmental impacts and human health impacts, scenario 4 seems to be the best option. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Resilience is generally considered as the ability of a system to bounce back following a failure. 
This concept brings a different perspective on how systems should be designed and maintained 
in order to mitigate and prepare for external shocks. Systems designed with conventional risk-
based methods may be robust against known or expected disturbances; however, they remain 
vulnerable against unexpected shocks especially those with low probability and high 
consequences. Therefore, it is necessary that design and management of critical civil 
infrastructures incorporate resilience thinking so that these infrastructures are prepared to 
withstand disturbances such as climate change, natural and man-made disasters. Resilience in 
infrastructure systems is not just about protecting and recovering the technical aspects, but also 
improving the resilience in local communities, local economy, associated environmental 
systems, and any other systems that may be affected by the functionality of the infrastructure 
systems. In order to understand resilience from multiple points of view, the concept was 
studied across different disciplines like ecology, social science, economy, and engineering. 
From the literature review, the key aspects of resilience were identified which include, 
robustness, rapidity, resourcefulness, redundancy, adaptability, and transformability.   
    
A quantitative framework for assessing the resilience of geotechnical infrastructure against 
various hazard scenarios was presented in this thesis. The DPSIR framework was utilized and 
reinterpreted for the development of the proposed framework so that it is applicable to 
geotechnical infrastructure systems. In this study, the proposed framework was demonstrated 
using a case study of road embankments in a transportation network in the province of Ontario 
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subjected to floods. Hazard scenarios on floods were generated with varying rainfall intensities. 
Metrics which reflect the robustness, rapidity, resourcefulness, and redundancy aspects of 
resilience were developed to evaluate multiple aspects of resilience in the network of road 
embankments. The robustness aspect of resilience was computed based on the change in factor 
of safety and settlement of road embankments during the floods. The rapidity was calculated 
by the speed of recovery in terms of factor of safety and settlement. The resourcefulness was 
expressed in terms of proportional cost of repair and construction with respect to the available 
provincial budget.  The redundancy aspect was calculated in terms of network entropy that 
indicated how distributed the network is after disruptions caused by flood. The social aspect of 
resilience was captured by calculating the loss of leisure time for commuters because of traffic 
delay.  
 
Life cycle assessment was utilized to measure the environmental impacts of the damaged road 
embankment network; economic losses were quantified by estimating construction costs for 
mitigation and restoration actions, social impacts were measured in terms of human health 
damage; and technical impacts were quantified by the change in traffic volumes and travel 
times after the disruptions. The change in factor of safety, settlement, network entropy, and 
leisure time were considered as performance functions to compute the resilience of the 
transportation network consisting of road embankments. Five response strategies that have 
different combinations of mitigation and rehabilitation actions were generated and evaluated 
based on the calculations using all relevant metrics that consider the resilience and impacts 
explained above. Construction of toe berms was considered as a mitigation measure to improve 
the slope stability of embankments and lessen the damage of floods. The response strategies 
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incorporate approaches to improve adaptability and transformability of the embankments. 
Retrofitting and reconstruction of damaged embankments by the floods were considered as 
methods to improve the adaptability and transformability, respectively.  
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